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This study theoretically examines the metaphors and values associated with 
exceptional patriotism and Christians in order to examine the support of military drones 
in bombing attacks against terrorism. Utilizing George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s 
Metaphors We Live By, I used these identified values to explain the differentiating 
motives between those who do not support drones in bombing attacks against terrorism 
and, more particularly, those who do support drones. This study shows that historical, 
patriotic values support drones due to their strong ties to American exceptionalism. 
Therefore, military technology is quickly developing based upon traditional types of 
patriotisms, and despite more critical forms of patriotism.  
With respect to its theoretical foundations, this study showed three significant 
expectations were upheld in binary logistic regressions. First, exceptional patriotism 
increased the odds of drones in bombing attacks against terrorism. Exceptional 
patriotism was defined by its patriotic values and American exceptionalism rhetoric. 
Next, against all other religious preferences, Christians had higher odds of supporting 
drones until its interaction with the white male variable was introduced into the final 
model. The addition of this interaction variable showed that being white and male was a 
significant moderating variable for Christians in drone support. Lastly, another 
expectation was met in the relationship between patriotic Christians in the West and 
drone support, as patriotic Christians in the West had higher odds of drone support. 
Using the observations of 1,970 respondents from data collected by the Chicago 
Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy of 2014, a series 
of binary logistic regression models were used to examine these expectations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In my study, I examine the association between patriotic values and the support 
of unmanned aerial vehicles – also referred to as ‘drones’ – in bombing attacks against 
terrorism. Between the 9/11 attacks and the year 2011, nearly $1.3 trillion was approved 
for military spending. Although most of the money has gone into the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, some of the money has been invested in dream projects such as drone 
technologies (Greenemeier, 2011). Additionally, since the attacks on September 11th, 
patriotic values and militaristic practices have developed a uniquely positive association 
with the perceived threat within the Southern region of the United States (Skitka, 2005). 
If these values and practices can significantly predict the support for particular types of 
military intervention, such as drones or the general use of robotic technologies, then it 
would be useful to further dissect these values and practices in order to examine the 
intentions or justifications for the armament and military use of drones.   
In my research, I justify the importance of this research with a discussion of the 
ethical and moral concerns surrounding the military use of drones and robotic 
technologies. Next, I validate the examination of patriotic values and Christian identity 
by exploring the theoretical framework. Then, I discuss relevant past research on 
patriotic correlations as well as patriotism found in dominant groups. Empirically, I then 
discuss the process used in order to prove my hypotheses as well as define a new form 
of patriotism, “exceptional patriotism.” Lastly, I provide a description of the results, 
concluding remarks, and a discussion over the implications of this research.  
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Chapter 2: Ethical Concerns 
Although air warfare has been utilized for a little over a hundred years, there has 
been a consistent development of drone technology in order to decrease the overall need 
for humans to be physically present during war. Morally, this would decrease human 
casualty; logically, this would decrease the cost of training, housing, and incentives 
used by military recruiters. It was not until the early 1990’s that the United States began 
investing in modern-day drones in order to gather information during the Bosnian war. 
In the beginning of the 21st century, drones were capable of streaming live video and 
being armed over Afghanistan to target enemy forces as well as gather information. 
Today, drones can be as small as an insect or as large as an airplane as well as have a 
variety of capabilities. A particular model is usually chosen based on the distance of the 
mission from military base as well as the nature of the mission (Bergen, 2015).  
Within the academic and activist community, the arming of drones has sparked 
the discussion over who should have the authority to control such a vehicle. Society’s 
understanding of efficacy and legalities affects how society understands and interprets 
the combative capabilities of drones such as targeted killings (Duval, 2014). Many 
people are hesitant to support drones in military interventions because of a 
‘responsibility gap,’ defined by Robert Sparrow (2007) as the possibility that actions 
cannot be held completely accountable to a single human individual. Sparrow argues 
that the ‘responsibility gap’ would prevent any human being – whether the commander, 
the programmers, etc. – from being held legitimately responsible for a mistake made by 
an autonomous weapon. For example, because there is not a dependable way to ensure 
that it may function or be handled properly in the absence of a human being, mistakes 
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of an armed drone cannot be ultimately tied to one individual due to the large team of 
individuals who are typically involved in the execution of a drone. When there is a team 
of engineers and military personnel who are stationed hundreds of miles away from the 
mission, who are engaged with troops on the ground as well as intelligence analysts 
across the United States through Internet chat rooms, it would be difficult to hold an 
individual legitimately and solely responsible for an error made by the drone or in the 
mission itself (Miller, 2012). 
Although Purves and colleagues (2015) try to consider the possibility of future 
autonomous robots as genuine moral decision makers, it can be argued that this would 
be highly improbable due to the fluidity of morality. When armed, drones and remotely 
piloted aircrafts are synonymously understood as autonomous weapon systems (AWS) 
which, by their definition, act upon robotic judgement in replication of a human moral 
judgement (Takahashi, 2012). Autonomous drones may be initially programmed to 
make decisions based upon morality; however, of whose morality are drones 
programmed? If one programmer is trusted with the morality of drones then the 
‘responsibility gap’ may improve; however, many other issues may arise with a 
complete dependence on one version of morality.  
Additionally, society remains ethically inconsistent of the use of robotic 
technology as objects of warfare. Results in a study conducted by Peter Danielson 
(2011) show that robotic technology during peace situations, such as robotic care for the 
elderly, was far less controversial and more acceptable than the use of robotic 
technology during war. Responses towards robots of war were consistently divided and 
contradicting, indicating a large lack of consensus over the correct use of robotic 
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technology as warfare. For example, respondents highly disapproved of the arming of 
remote-controlled aircraft as it possibly was seen as a disconnection from the decision 
of a physically present pilot. 
As discussed by Chetan Bhatt (2012), the current use of drones in targeted 
killings may contradict international humanitarian laws in regards to the lack of judicial 
process and declaration of war upon an individual within any country. In his discussion, 
Bhatt (2012) refers to Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-Yemeni citizen hiding in Yemen, as a 
prime example of the unnecessary, inhumane use of an already controversial robotic 
weapon. Al-Awlaki was on the CIA’s ‘kill list,’ and ordered to be killed by drone 
without a judicial process. Since the United States was not at war with Yemen, nor was 
the country at war in Yemen, the targeted killing of al-Awlaki took place outside of 
armed conflict. Without a judicial process and without a war, the United States is killing 
an individual based upon ambiguous ethical standards. Without an official declaration 
of war, the killing of an individual within a country that the United States is not at war 
with, nor at war in, would conflict with international humanitarian laws. Without this 
declaration, the killing of individuals without judicial process also opposes international 
humanitarian laws. 
As a product of social values, humanitarian law must adapt to the technological 
developments in warfare in order to constitute “the battlespace as a legal, social and 
geographical space in which violence is considered to be enacted legitimately” (Bhatt, 
2012: 826). The drone, according to PW Singer (2009), represents the large 
‘disconnect’ between the societal expectation of war and the reality of robotic wars. 
With the creation of drones as well as general military robotics, society’s understanding 
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of war has become outdated due to the new realities and technological revolution in 
war. In reality, the battlefield is no longer physically distinct and the knowledge of 
civilians is largely biased and antiquated due to the constant access to movies, news 
outlets, and other modes of media. Society believes that war is still solely dependent on 
human combatant whereas war is actually transforming into cyber interventions and 
robotic combat. In sum, because of this lack of understanding, social norms and values 
are not yet able to adapt to the new forms of military interventions. 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
Cultural Lag Theory 
According to William Ogburn (1966), society has created material culture, defined as 
all physical objects that people create (i.e. technical development), as well as non-
material culture, defined as thoughts that people learn and practice as a product of their 
culture (i.e. moral and legal institutions). Cultural lag is the gap between material and 
non-material culture due to the rapid rate of technological development and the slow 
degree of cultural adjustment. Because non-material culture is often unquestioned by 
society, this lag is believed to be capable of increasing by months, years, or decades. In 
the event of cultural lag, Ogburn identifies four general processes of social change: 
invention, diffusion, accumulation, and adjustment. The invention process refers to the 
development of new technology; more broadly, the new technology is created entirely 
or through a mixture of old cultural traits. Diffusion refers to the dispersion process 
when the new technology becomes accessible. Accumulation occurs when the new 
technology is absorbed into the society, and values and concepts begin to adjust to the 
new cultural traits necessary to accept the new technology. In return, the invention also 
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absorbs into social usage, completing the adjustment process. In this process, cultural 
lag is typically found between invention and diffusion, before any process to 
accumulate or adjust may be considered. This lag can decrease or increase over time if 
the culture does not develop new norms in order to adapt to the new technology. 
Although war has historically influenced the rapid rate of technological 
development, it has been developing at a much higher rate over the last century. Since 
the early 1990’s, the United States military has been investing in a new model of 
warfare, referred to as the revolution in military affairs (RMA). With the intentionally 
high rate of development in military organization and tactics, surveillance, precision 
targeting, and force mobility, military technology is no longer developing based upon a 
current war but preparing itself for future wars. According to Joelian Pretorius (2008), 
this will become very problematic from a worldview perspective. The technological 
culture which drives the development of military technology will create bigger issues 
surrounding social responsibility. Using nuclear weapons as an example, Pretorius 
states that society had become blinded by the myth that military technological 
superiority provides security. Additionally, he argues that technology keeps society in a 
state of war preparation. Although newer drone technologies are being developed, the 
justifications to develop this technology have not.  
Metaphors We Live By 
Within the theoretical framework of this research, the most relevant example of 
non-material culture are the belief systems within the United States and the 
metaphorical meanings from which they are conceptualized. In Metaphors We Live By 
(1980), George Lakoff and Mark Johnson consider metaphors as an inherent way to 
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establish meaning in everyday language and communication. The metaphors are 
embedded in language in order to conceptualize the human experience and 
understanding, therefore helping to identify the roots of culture by how language is 
practiced. For example, arguments are usually described or engaged in as a battle of war 
such as “He attacked every weak point in my argument” or “Your claims are 
indefensible” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 4). By embedding this metaphor (act of war) 
into the description of the human experience (an argument), a person gains the 
understanding of the cultural experience of an argument as well as the source for war. 
Rather than conceptualizing an argument as a dance, Lakoff and Johnson describe 
Western culture’s understanding of an argument as a battle.  
Based on this principle, metaphors found in patriotic language is another 
example for how patriotism is understood and practiced in United States society. 
Language used in American patriotic songs provides insight in how patriotism may be 
culturally performed. In one of the many patriotic songs where the United States is 
directly referenced, Kate Smith’s version of ‘God Bless America’ (1938) requires a 
person to “stand beside her and guide her.” Like many well-known songs or speeches, 
the country United States is humanized to the point where it is feminized with the use of 
gendered pronouns. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) would call this attachment of human 
characteristics to nonhuman entities as ‘personification.’ This occurs when a nonhuman 
object is personified in order to metaphorically understand phenomena in human terms. 
In the case of feminizing America, ‘she’ is also typically described in terms of nature 
and landscape – “O’ beautiful for spacious skies, For amber waves of grain, For purple 
mountain majesties, Above the fruited plain” (Bates and Ward, 1904) – which implies 
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concepts such as vulnerability and beauty. The gendered personification and nature-
centered descriptions can be explained by ecofeminism, which considers women as 
closer to nature while understanding men in terms of a predisposition to control nature 
much like they do women (Zmroczek, 1987). Additionally, this gendered description of 
America is also explained by feminist analyses where the masculine and masculine 
language is associated with technology while the feminine and feminine language is 
associated with nature (Zimmerman, 1986).  
Traditional femininity, such as the femininity that is associated with nature, 
places itself within the gender binary system as being protected and controlled by 
traditional masculinity. In the masculine role, a patriot must protect the femininized 
country by ‘standing’ beside her and ‘guiding’ her (Smith, 1938). These actions 
represent the roles ascribed to traditional masculinity: ‘protecting’ and ‘controlling’ the 
feminine. ‘Protection’ is a key word used by patriotism in order to validate the use of 
military technologies such as armed drones (Kelly, 2012; Fuller, 2014). However, 
according to Thomas Burns (1999), the diversity found in members of various 
communities will likely affect the different ways that individuals understand concepts 
like ‘protection.’ Because of this diversity, Burns refers to an ‘attentional vote’ as an 
individual’s decision to choose the message that coincides best with their own belief. 
Therefore, broad and indistinguishable messages in rhetoric, such as the protection of 
one’s country, can be applied and personally understood by many individuals of many 
different backgrounds. For example, the patriotism conceptualized in songs such as 
‘America, the Beautiful’ could potentially be understood as a call to ‘protect’ the 
environment as a patriotic act; however, likely due to the historical context in which the 
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song was written, it would not be difficult for an individual patriot to understand the 
meaning of ‘protection’ in terms of action against out-group threats. Therefore, it is 
necessary to acknowledge different forms of patriotism which have interpreted 
“protection” in terms of outward action as well as a patriotism which has interpreted 
“protection” in terms of inward action.  
When referring to one’s country, patriotism generally does not identify a 
particular threat from which a country needs to protect. In this context, one’s country is 
portrayed as the pure and beautiful; however, the ambiguity found in patriotism portrays 
outside entities as threats – “‘Cause the flag still stands for freedom and they can’t take 
that away” (Greenwood, 1984, emphasis added). Due to the implied passive role of the 
feminine country, the masculine patriot is expected to practice the traditionally active 
and aggressive role in order to defend the country. The pronoun ‘they’ is a general word 
used in patriotic language that helps to distinguish the in-group from the out-group. In 
patriotic language, ‘they’ is typically used to identify a vague enemy which the country 
needs to take action against. For example, in the State of the Union, George W. Bush 
states: 
Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view 
the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. So 
long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at 
risk. And America and our allies must not and will not allow it. (Bush, 2002) 
 
Yet, tens of thousands of trained terrorists are still at large. These enemies view 
the entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are. So long as 
training camps operate, so long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And 
America and our allies must not and will not allow it (Bush, 2002). 
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By excluding a description of ‘terrorists’ and providing a general picture where 
many individuals can imagine their own understanding of how and why freedom is in 
danger, Bush was able to convey America’s responsibility to pursue these shadowy 
threats. The deeply rooted metaphors found in patriotic communication, therefore, 
translate into the American expectation to take outward action against any perceived 
threat in order to preserve the life and dignity of one’s country. Because of the loyalty 
and action associated with masculine patriotism, this study shows that respondents who 
believe in patriotic values have higher odds of supporting armed drones due to his belief 
that one’s country would be spared from harm and dishonor. Much like how a husband 
is to protect a wife – “For this is my country, to have and to hold” (Jacobs, 1940) – the 
patriot will go great lengths to defend one’s country.  
Regional Framework: American Exceptionalism 
 This study explores the combination of patriotic and exceptional values and their 
odds of drone support. By definition, American exceptionalism argues that the United 
States is uniquely superior based upon its wealth, power, political process, and moral 
compass. According to Godfrey Hodgson (2009), this exceptionalism is constituted by 
several different viewpoints. People claim that America’s exceptionalism stems from its 
resources and material opportunity which could not be acquired by immigrants 
elsewhere. A second view states that American exceptionalism is demonstrated by 
America’s absence of class divisions. Although this can be argued based upon events in 
American history, this point of view believes that a person is not confined to the 
disadvantages of a lower class unless by his/her own fault. Hodgson (2009) also 
discusses a third view which argues that social class did not infiltrate American politics, 
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much like how socialism played an important part in European politics. Generally, 
however, American exceptionalism can be most identified by the ‘unique’ aspect of its 
definition. Concepts such as freedom, liberty, and equality is perceived as particularly 
American, despite contradicting events which made each of these concepts only 
relevant to white, upper-class, male American culture.  
American exceptionalism is practiced as a way to differentiate the United States 
against all other nations and, historically, against Europe. Based on this premise, many 
of the values and characteristics associated with American exceptionalism are also 
found in patriotism. However, American exceptionalism also has a deeply rooted 
relationship with Christianity as New England Puritans first applied the concept of 
‘exceptionalism’ in order to use the opportunity of a new land – their ‘Eden’ – as a way 
to also create a society of ‘Adams’ (Lewis, 1959). For example, the rhetoric found in 
John Winthrop’s 1630 declaration associates New England as a “[City] upon a Hill” in 
order to depict the individuals of New England as subjects and examples of God. As 
examples, the world is watching New England as a testament of their Christian God: if 
New England fails, then the world will blame their God – “wee shall be made a story 
and a byword through the world, wee shall open the mouthes of enemies to speake evill 
of the ways of God and all professours for Gods sake” (Winthrop, 1630) – however, if 
New England succeeds, then they will be blessed. According to Winthrop and early 
believers of American Exceptionalism, the people of New England have been chosen by 
God to be the superior example of the world. 
With the help of Jonathan Edwards, the rhetoric of American exceptionalism 
soon adjusted to new generations of Americans as well as to the general traits of 
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patriotism, with new concepts such as individualism, self-reliance, and libertarianism 
(Vandivinit, 2014). This development gave purpose to a new nation “without a past, a 
people without a common customs, a territory without clear boundaries, and an 
economy without a stable center” (Bercovitch, 1978: 140). Though useful for the 
American Revolution, this developing definition of American exceptionalism also 
justified residential expansion in the United States. According to Vandivinit, the notion 
of self-reliance particularly deemed the westward expansion as necessary, “not only as a 
territorial affirmation and definition of God’s will but also as an exercise in spreading 
the new ideological consensus” (Vandivinit, 2014: 170). Further, exceptionalism was 
also used to unify the United States in the midst of ethnic and religious diversity which 
arguably turned into a way to conform the American individual to an exceptional tool of 
American society. 
The West 
 A product of Manifest Destiny and westward expansion, the West was founded 
based upon the United States’ belief that the American people have an inherited 
responsibility based upon the new American rhetoric of exceptionalism. By expanding 
westward, the common man could gain economic prosperity and autonomy. However, 
resonating its roots with Christianity, the west symbolically represents a place of 
biblical rebirth. Much like the purity and rebirth associated with baptism, the west was 
perceived as a frontier, “untouched by civilization” and, therefore, a place of 
resurrection (Vandivinit, 2014: 171). The west was also perceived as a place where a 
man could reach his full potential, much like how earlier New England Puritans 
associated their God-given responsibility to represent Him in their new world. 
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Therefore, the West region is a historical product of American exceptionalism, deeply 
entrenched with Christian metaphors. 
According to Linda Skitka (2005), flag-display behaviors in the West showed a 
particularly large increase of flag-display behavior after 9/11 based upon one’s self-
reported love for country and non-flag-related value-affirming behaviors such as 
donating blood and charitable donations. Additionally, the extent of flag display was 
associated with lower levels of education and high levels of income (Skitka, 2005).  
The South 
 Linda Skitka (2005) also discussed the South’s relationship with flag-display 
behaviors after 9/11, which could be explained by self-reported patriotism as well as an 
adjustment to fears of threat. Perceived threat was conceptualized by measurements 
such as the degree of worry that people felt about future terrorist attacks, being in tall 
buildings, and the personal safety of themselves and their family. The South’s 
patriotism was also uniquely associated with negative outgroup attitudes which appear 
nationalistic; however, the South’s flag-display behavior was only significantly 
associated with self-reported patriotism and value-affirming behaviors which indicates 
patriotism rather than nationalism. Stitka’s (2005) distinct results in the South’s can be 
explained by Finell and Zogmaister’s (2015) description of blind patriotism which 
characterizes a blind patriot’s imagining of the country as “[having] fought for its 
freedom against an overwhelming enemy” (Finell & Zogmaister, 189, 2015). Due to the 
majority of the South’s historical participation in the American Civil War, the South 
may be more vulnerable to a traditional form of patriotism which shows an 
unquestioning allegiance to country.  
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Although some argue that the American Civil War was in no way unique, 
different, or exceptional based upon the objective commonalities of the North and South 
– same language, same legal system, an interconnected economy, same history – 
Stephanie McCurry (2012) argues that the Civil War was particularly exceptional based 
upon the events that occurred post-war. Instead of mass trials for treason or political 
repression like that found in other civil wars, the South was still allowed to form 
opposition political parties and Andrew Johnson issued blanket amnesties. The United 
States not only allowed anti-North stories and reminiscences of the war, but encouraged 
them. Before the war, the South situated itself against the North which further 
contributed to their subjective application of morality and religion to state institutions; 
by the sanctioning of Civil War stories and anti-North political parties, the post-war 
South was able to continue their practices as well as engage in a collective memory of 
the Civil War (McPherson, 1983; McCurry, 2012).  
Because the post-war South was still able to regulate their own institutions such 
as education, they were also allowed to continue their objection to many of the 
progressive actions that were associated with the North. Therefore, today’s South still 
practices many of their pre-Civil War values and beliefs associated with separation of 
church and state as well as agriculture (McCurry, 2012). These values contribute to the 
South’s fear of outside aggressions as well as the South’s perception that the 
government reflects their dominant Christian group which, in turn, will contribute to 
their support of drones in combatting terrorism. Because of the historical 
exceptionalism which founded the West and the historical implications of the South, I 
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infer that the “exceptional patriotism” found in the West and South regions is the most 
supportive for the use of drones in bombing attacks.  
Altogether, the symbols and rhetoric used to encourage occupation in the West 
as well as maintain a Southern identity can be explained by Thomas Burns and Terri 
LeMoyne (2003) who refer to faith in authority: “… the masses, unable to deal with the 
overload of social information, search eagerly for simplification strategies. These 
simplification strategies make them more likely to acquiesce to emotional appeals” 
(Burns and LeMoyne, 2003: 83). In the midst of information technologies, people learn 
to make sense of their proper behavior by prioritizing symbols that are most related to 
their morality. Therefore, the religious symbols and rhetoric in American 
exceptionalism justify the expansion to the West as well as endorse the South’s freedom 
to integrate subtle religious morality. Political leaders and strategists, in both situations, 
used masculine rhetoric with religious symbols to allow the South and West to 
“implement their constructs in their own thoughts and speech” (Burns and LeMoyne, 
2003, 84). Therefore, the West region will support expansion strategies while the South 
will oppose further uprising against the Union based upon the summary interpreted by 
their personal morality (Burns and LeMoyne, 2003).  
Chapter 4: Review of Past Research 
Patriotism 
 Many studies have identified demographic backgrounds and attitudes which can 
predict patriotism. Additionally, patriotism has been used in order to predict attitudes 
and behaviors. Lastly, because of the wide variety of measurements for a love one’s 
16 
country, researchers have also identified different types of patriotism in order to 
acknowledge a person’s motivations and values pertaining to patriotism. 
In order to examine dominant/subordinate social structures and various levels of 
patriotism, Yoshito Ishio (2010) expands on the group dominance perspective by 
proposing the ‘generalized group dominance perspective.’ Using an individual’s 
perception that one’s personal values correspond to the country’s values as an indicator 
of one’s sense of ownership of the country, an individual may have a strong or weak 
ownership of the country which in turn would affect an individual’s patriotism levels. 
Additionally, some of the strongest values are based upon one’s religion, indirectly 
affecting an individual’s overall patriotism (Schwartz and Huismans, 1995).  
Yoshito Ishio argues that people with a Christian faith have a stronger sense of 
ownership of the country and, therefore, a stronger patriotism due to their status as a 
dominant group. Further, those who are not Christian or not religious, may have a 
weaker sense of ownership and a weaker patriotism. Empirically, Ishio (2010) found 
that, when focusing on white Americans, Christian identification had a significant effect 
on an individual’s level of patriotism. As the dominant religious group, individuals with 
a Christian faith perceive their government as representative of their religious values. 
American Christians are able to establish their status as the American civil religion due 
to God’s name on governmental institutions or practices such as the pledge of 
allegiance and forms of currency (e.g. coins) (Bellah, 2005).  
Intolerance for cultural diversity also has a positive relationship with patriotism 
within the white population. Wiong Li and Marilynn Brewer (2004) empirically tested a 
sample of white respondents on nationalism, patriotism, and their tolerance for cultural 
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diversity. Surveys were handed out with two varying priming conditions: one condition 
expressed the need to focus on what it means to be an American (core essence 
condition) while the other condition focused on the need to fight terrorism and work 
together (common goal condition). Under the ‘core essence’ definition of American 
unity, Li and Brewer (2004) found that patriotism was positively associated with 
derogatory attitudes towards other nations and intolerance for variation from a common 
cultural standard within the nation. Under the ‘common goal’ definition of American 
unity, patriotism was less associated with nationalistic values and uncorrelated with 
diversity. In any case, with or without the conditions of American unity, Li and Brewer 
(2004) state that patriotic and nationalistic identity combined are related to less 
tolerance to cultural diversity, negative attitudes toward minority groups, and restricted 
criteria for identification as a “true” American. 
Similarly, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) found that patriotism and 
nationalism were two different dimensions based upon attitudes, feelings, and motives. 
Demographically, they found that foreign born individuals had higher levels of 
nationalism than respondents who were born within the United States; however, 
respondents who were born within the United States had higher levels of patriotism. 
Additionally, respondents in high school had higher levels of nationalism whereas 
respondents in college had higher levels of patriotism.  
Two forms of patriotism that have been of particular interest are blind and 
constructive patriotism. According to Staub (1997), blind patriotism is the rigid and 
inflexible attachment to country through its unquestioning positive evaluation. 
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Constructive patriotism, on the other hand, is defined by a critical loyalty where 
criticism is hoped to create positive change for the country (Staub, 1997).  
In a study done by Livi and colleagues (2014), blind patriotism was been found 
to be positively correlated with ideologies associated with right-wing authoritarianism, 
individuals who value uniformity and favor group authority, as well as social 
dominance orientation, the tendency to subject others to an individual’s anti-democratic 
authoritarianism. Values conceptualizing tradition were found to have a significantly 
positive effect on blind patriotism whereas universalism had a significantly negative 
effect. Constructive patriotism had opposite results; constructive patriotism was 
negatively correlated with right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation. Additionally, universalism had a positive effect on constructive patriotism. 
In another study, Schatz and colleagues (1999) found that both blind and constructive 
patriotism are positively correlated with national attachment; therefore, these 
patriotisms are different expressions for the same national attachment to country. 
Although blind and constructive patriotism are positively correlated with national 
attachment, Schatz and colleagues (1999) blind patriotism are a significantly strong 
relationship than constructive patriotism. Politically, Schatz and colleagues (1999) also 
show that blind patriotism is positively associated with conservatism and 
Republicanism; constructive patriotism, however, did not vary based upon political 
ideology or party identification. Furthermore, in a hierarchical regression analysis, 
significant results showed that blind patriotism was highly correlated with nationalism, 
national vulnerability, and cultural contamination (e.g. the perception and worry of 
foreign threats to the national culture). Within these variables, cultural contamination 
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was a significant negative predictor of constructive patriotism. Constructive patriotism 
showed positive associations with political efficacy, political knowledge, political 
information gathering, and political activism. Blind patriotism was either negatively 
related or unrelated to these variables. 
 Christopher Parker (2010) found that blind patriotism is distinguishable against 
symbolic patriotism despite their analytical similarities. He concluded that blind 
patriotism is driven by fear and insecurity, particularly in times of conflict, whereas 
symbolic patriotism functions as an expression of core values. For example, blind 
patriotism works as an adjustment to a perceived threat while symbolic patriotism 
works as an attempt to identify with national values. For example, past research shows 
that blind patriotism is associated with continued support for the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars, confidence that the United States will win the War on Terror, as well as a 
perceived threat against one’s country (McFarland, 2005; Sahar, 2008; Schatz, Staub, & 
Lavine, 1999). Additionally, Parker (2010) found that blind patriotism holds a 
xenophobic and ethnocentric bias which also suggests the importance of race when 
examining the different types of patriotism.   
Chapter 5: Design and Methods 
Expectations 
 Because of the ethically ambiguous nature of drones as a means for how the 
United States combats terrorism, I will look at several independent variables which may 
influence the continued support for drone strikes. When considering Lakoff and 
Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, are values and meanings associated with patriotism, 
Christianity, and dominant group identities strong enough to validate the ethical and 
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legal concerns of the use of drones in bombing attacks? When considering the 
theoretical and historical foundation for values associated with patriotism, American 
exceptionalism, Christianity, and dominant group identities, I have a few expectations 
of selected variables and their effect on drone support. Due to the rhetoric in American 
exceptionalism and the values associated with patriotic metaphors, I expect that 
exceptional patriotism will have a positive effect on drone support. Further, because of 
the Christian undertones of American exceptionalism and research on Christians as a 
dominant group (Ishio, 2010), I also expect that Christians will have a positive effect on 
drone support. Because of the metaphors in patriotism, I expect that white males will 
increase exceptional patriotism’s and Christians’ positive effect on drone support. 
Because of the masculine responsibilities assigned through patriotism, white males are 
expected to feel particularly obligated to protect their country by all means necessary. 
Therefore, due to their prioritizing of symbols and metaphors, white males will increase 
the effect of exceptional patriotism and Christians. Lastly, because of the historical 
implications of patriotism and American exceptionalism on the South and West regions, 
I expect that exceptional patriotism and Christian identification will be significant in the 
South and West regions when examining the odds of drone support. 
Data and Sample 
 The sample used for the study comes from the Chicago Council Survey of 
American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy of 2014. According to the Chicago 
Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy of 2014 
Codebook, the target population of the Chicago Council Survey was non-
institutionalized adults who live in the United States, and included an oversample of 
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Hispanic adults. In total, 3,146 households were sampled with a 61% completion rate 
(i.e. 1,914 completed surveys). Additionally, 142 cases were excluded by failing at least 
one quality check. These checks include: 1) Completing the survey in 10 minutes or 
less; 2) Failing to answer 50% or more of the survey; 3) Not accurately inputting a “4”, 
refused, or skipped a question entirely; 4) Refusing one or more full battery of 5 
attributes or more; and 5) Straight-lining their responses to a battery of grid questions. 
In the results, I examine 1,970 respondents throughout the models to investigate the 
same respondents in the final model. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
 Drone Support. The dependent variable in this study is whether or not 
respondents show support for the use of drones in bombing attacks that are said to 
combat terrorism. Respondents were asked the following: In order to combat 
international terrorism, please say whether you favor or oppose each of the following 
measures – Drone strikes to carry out bombing attacks against suspected terrorists. (1) 
Favor; (2) Oppose. For this study, drone support was coded into a dummy variable; 
respondents who favor drone strikes were coded as (1) and respondents who oppose 
drone strikes were recoded as the reference category (0).  
Independent Variables 
 Exceptional Patriotism. Patriotism is measured by the highest, unequivocal 
evaluation for one’s country even when comparing to other countries. Based on past 
literature, the language found in patriotism is very similar to the language practiced with 
American Exceptionalism. My conceptualization of exceptional patriotism will 
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encompass patriotic language as well as the language engaged by American 
Exceptionalism. The following question are used for the exceptional patriotism 
variable: Some people say the United States has a unique character that makes it the 
greatest country in the world. Others say that every country is unique, and the United 
States is no greater than other nations. Which view is closer to your own: (1) The U.S. 
is the greatest country in the world; (2) No greater than other nations. Exceptional 
patriotism was recoded into a dummy variable with the reference category being 
respondents who do not believe that the U.S. is the greatest country in the world.  
Christian. Christian is conceptualized by a respondent’s religious preference in 
the survey. Respondents were asked their religious preference with the following 
options: (1) Christian; (2) Jewish; (3) Muslim; (4) Hindu; (5) Other; and (6) No 
religion. In order to conceptualize Christianity identification, Christian was recoded as 
(1) while Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Other, and No religion were recoded into the 
reference category (0).  
Patriotic Christian South. In order to encompass respondents who were 
exceptionally patriotic and Christian while living in the South, three dummy variables 
were interacted. In order to capture respondents who live in the South, a regional 
variable was used based upon the four regions United States Census Bureau: the 
Northeast (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania); the Midwest (Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, and South Dakota), the South (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, 
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Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas); and the 
West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, 
Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington). The South variable was created 
by recoding the regional variable into a dummy variable; South was recoded as (1) 
while the other regions were recoded into the reference category. To create the 
interaction variable, Patriotic Christian South, the product of exceptional patriotism, 
Christian, and South were calculated. 
Patriotic Christian West. To create a variable for respondents who were 
exceptionally patriotic and Christian while living in the West, three dummy variables 
were interacted. The West variable was created by recoding the regional variable into a 
dummy variable; West was recoded as (1) while the other regions were recoded into the 
reference category. To create the variable Patriotic Christian West, the product of 
exceptional patriotism, Christian, and West were calculated into an interaction variable. 
Moderating Variable 
White Male. White male is measured by two questions. In order to 
conceptualize male, gender was recoded as a dummy variable: (1) Male and (0) Female. 
In the survey, race/ethnicity was originally coded as (1) White, Non-Hispanic; (2) 
Black, Non-Hispanic; (3) Other, Non-Hispanic; (4) Hispanic; and (5) 2+ Races, Non-
Hispanic. To capture respondents who are white, race/ethnicity was recoded into a 
dummy variable with White, Non-Hispanic as (1) while other the other categories were 
recoded into the reference category (0). After recoding these variables, they were 
combined into an interaction variable in order to encompass respondents who are both 
white and male while all other variations of gender and race are the reference category.  
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Control Variables 
Following past research, my study includes control variables that may affect 
drone support. These control variables include political conservatism, education, access 
to the internet, income, and age.  
 Conservatism. The following question is used: In general, do you think of 
yourself as (1) Extremely liberal; (2) Liberal; (3) Slightly liberal; (4) Moderate, middle 
of the road; (5) Slightly conservative; (6) Conservative; and (7) Extremely conservative. 
Based upon literature in political leanings (Fiorina, 2010), most individuals should be 
considered moderates based upon issues that are often defined ‘polarizing.’ Therefore, 
when conceptualizing conservatism, I used the categories that used language which 
definitively described the respondent as conservative (i.e. Conservative and Extremely 
conservative) rather than including a respondent who, realistically, could be politically 
moderate. Therefore, Conservative and Extremely conservative were recoded into (1) 
while all other options were recoded into the reference category (0).  
 Age. In this study, the age variable is used as the only continuous variable. It is 
used in its original form in order to see its relationship with drone support. 
 Education. Educational attainment may also have a relationship with drone 
support. The following scale is used: (1) Less than high school; (2) High school; (3) 
Some college; and (4) Bachelor’s degree or higher. In order to explore the educational 
attainment’s contribution to the logistic regression models, three dummy variables were 
created: Less than high school, High school, and Some college. Less than high school is 
a variable with respondents who did not receive a high school diploma or GED recoded 
as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The High school variable was 
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created by recoding respondents who have a high school diploma or GED as (1) while 
the other categories are recoded as (0). The Some college variable was created by 
recoding respondents who have completed a variation of years in college or have an 
associate’s degree without being granted a Bachelor’s degree as (1), and the other 
categories are recoded as (0). With the combination of these dummy variables, 
respondents who have a Bachelor’s degree or higher are the reference category. 
Internet Access. The dataset recorded the households’ internet access status. 
This question was recoded as a dummy variable: (0) Household does not have internet 
access and (1) Household has internet access. 
 Income. The income of the respondent was based upon the respondent’s 
household income. Response categories are: Less than $5,000; $5,000 to $7,499; $7,500 
to $9,999; $10,000 to $12,499; $12,500 to $14,999; $15,000 to $19,999; $20,000 to 
$24,999; $25,000 to $29,999; $30,000 to $34,999; $35,000 to $39,999; $40,000 to 
$49,999; $50,000 to $59,999; $60,000 to $74,999; $75,000 to $84,999; $85,000 to 
$99,999; $100,000 to $124,999; $125,000 to $149,999; $150,000 to $174,999; and 
$175,000 or more. Using a quartile split in order to create an income variable that is 
reflective of its sample, the original responses were split into the following three 
categories: 1) Respondents whose income is less than $34,999; 2) Respondents whose 
incomes are between $35,000 and $59,999; 3) Respondents whose incomes are between 
$60,000 and $124,999; and 4) Respondents whose incomes are more than $125,000. In 
order to explore income’s relationship in the logistic regression models, three dummy 
variables were created: Income less than $34,999; Income between $35,000 and 
$59,999; and Income between $60,000 and $124,999. Income less than $34,999 is a 
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variable with respondents whose household income is less than $34,999 who were 
recoded as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The Income between 
$35,000 and $59,999 variable was created by recoding respondents who have a 
household income between $35,000 and $59,999 as (1) while the other categories are 
recoded as (0). The Income between $60,000 and $124,999 variable was created by 
recoding respondents who have a household income between $60,000 and $124,000 as 
(1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). With the combination of these dummy 
variables, respondents who have a household income over $125,000 are the reference 
category. 
 Religious Attendance. The following question is used: Apart from weddings 
and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? (1) More than once a week; 
(2) Once a week; (3) Once or twice a month; (4) Several times a year; (5) Hardly ever; 
(6) Never. A religious attendance variable was recoded as the following: 1) 
Respondents who reported going to religious services at least once a week were recoded 
into the first category; 2) Respondents who reported going to religious services once or 
twice a month were recoded into the second category; 3) Respondents who reported 
going to religious services several times a year or hardly ever were recoded into the 
third category; and 4) Respondents who reported never going to religious services were 
recoded into the fourth category. From this variable, three dummy variables were 
created in order to look at its relationship with drone support. The sometimes attends 
variable was created by recoding respondents who go to religious services once or twice 
a month as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The hardly attends variable 
was created by recoding respondents who go to religious services several times a year 
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or hardly ever as (1) while the other categories are recoded as (0). The never attends 
variable was created by recoding respondents who never go to religious services as (1) 
while the other categories were recoded as (0). With the combination of these dummy 
variables, respondents who attend religious services at least once a week are the 
reference category. 
Analytical Strategy 
 First, I estimated a binary logistic regression to examine the effect of 
exceptional patriotism on drone support. Next, I ran another binary logistic regression 
to examine the effect of Christian on drone support. Third, I included the white male 
variable in a binary logistic regression by interacting exceptional patriotism and white 
male in order to calculate the change of effect that exceptional patriotism has on drone 
support. For my fourth expectation, I estimated another binary logistic regression with 
white male by interacting white male and Christian in order to examine the change of 
effect Christian has on drone support. For the fifth and sixth expectations, I examined 
the effects of Patriotic Christian South and Patriotic Christian West on drone support. 
Odds ratio values were used to examine and report the results. 
Chapter 6: Results 
Variable Descriptions 
 A complete description of variables can be found in Table 1. Out of 1,970 
respondents, 1,336 favored drones in bombing attacks against terrorism (64.2%). 
Exceptional Patriotism responses were available for 2,046 respondents (67% 
exceptionally patriotic; 33% not exceptionally patriotic). Christian was available for 
2,046 respondents (69.6% Christian; 30.4% not Christian). A total of 657 respondents 
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identified as a white male while 1,389 respondents identified as not white and male. Out 
of the respondents being used, 35.7% of the respondents live in the South region of the 
United States while 25.3% respondents live in the West.  
 In the controls, the dummy variable Less than high school shows that 12.2% of 
the respondents had less than a high school diploma or GED while the dummy variable 
High school shows that 31% of the respondents have a high school diploma. 
Additionally, the dummy variable Some college shows that 25.3% of the respondents 
have less than a Bachelor’s degree; however, some of these respondent’s may have an 
Associate’s degree. Bachelor’s degree or more, a dummy variable conceptualizing the 
reference category, shows that 31.5% of the respondents had at least a Bachelor’s 
degree.  
Next, Table 1 also shows that 80.7% of the respondents had access to the 
internet in their household. As a continuous variable, age had a mean of 48.83 and a 
standard deviation of 17.13.  
Next, the Income dummy variables also show a few distributions: the Income 
less than $34,999 dummy variable shows that 28.6% of the respondents have a 
household income of less than $34,999; the Income between $35,000 and $59,999 
dummy variable shows that 21.8% of the respondents have a household income 
between $35,000 and $59,999; and Income between $60,000 and $124,999 shows that 
34.8% of the respondents have an income between $60,000 and $124,999. The 
reference category, Income more than $125,000, had 302 positive responses. There 
were 673 respondents who reported a high attendance level while 1,411 respondents 
reported a lower attendance level. 2,108 respondents had data for Gender (50.7% male; 
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49.3% female) as well as Race/Ethnicity (62.3% White, Non-Hispanic; 7.7% Black, 
Non-Hispanic; 3.8% Other, Non-Hispanic; 23.6% Hispanic; 2.6% multi-racial, Non-
Hispanic). Political leaning also had data for 2,108 respondents (23.2% Conservative; 
76.8% Not Conservative). A total of 1,970 respondents had complete data for the final 
model of this analysis. 
In the religious attendance dummy variables, 8.1% of the respondents are coded 
as Sometimes attends, 39.3% of the respondents are coded as Rarely attends, and 20.3% 
of the respondents are coded as Never attends. As the reference category, Often attends 
shows that 32.1% of the respondents go to religious services at least once a week. 
In these observations, 51% of the respondents are male while 49% are female. 
Also, 62.5% of the respondents are white while all other races as well as Hispanics 
encompass 37.5% of these observations. 
 Lastly, our conservatism variable shows that 23.4% of the respondents are 
conservative while 76.6% of the respondents are not conservative. 
Model Results 
 Table 2, Model 1 shows that exceptional patriotism was independently 
associated with drone support. With an odds ratio value of 3.435, patriotic respondents 
have 243.5% greater odds to support drones than unpatriotic respondents (p-value: 
0.000). With a Chi-Square value of 150.831, this model is significant with a p-value of 
0.000. Without controls, this model shows that respondents who are exceptionally 
patriotic have greater odds of drone support than respondents who are not. 
Table 2, Model 2 shows that Christian are independently associated with drone 
support; Christian respondents are 88.5% more likely to support drones than 
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respondents who are not Christian (p-value 0.000). Additionally, this model has a Chi-
Square value of 38.445 with a p-value of 0.000. According to this model, we can state 
that the Christian variable has a significant effect on the odds of drone support without 
controls. 
In Table 2, Model 3, the addition of white male does not increase exceptional 
patriotism’s odds ratio coefficient. This model shows that exceptional patriotism still 
has 241.0% higher odds of supporting drones than respondents who are not 
exceptionally patriotic. By block, the model’s Chi-Square value is 60.962 with a p-
value of 0.000, showing that the addition of white male has an effect on the fit of the 
model. The increase and significance of the Chi-Square value shows that the inclusion 
of this interaction variable is significant in determining the odds of drone support. This 
model also shows that the white and male dummy variables have a significantly positive 
effect on the odds of drone support. Although the white male interaction variable is not 
significant in terms of odds, this model shows that whites have 109.8% greater odds of 
drone support than all other races and males have 106.8% greater odds of drone support 
than females. Because the interaction variable is not significant, the dynamic of being 
white or male is stronger in the odds of drone support than being white and male in this 
model. 
In Table 2, Model 4, the interaction variable with white male and exceptional 
patriotism is included in a binary logistic regression. By block, the inclusion of this 
variable increased the Chi-Square value by 2.011 (p-level = 0.156). After I calculated 
the Akaike Information Criterion (−2𝐿𝐿 + 2(𝑝 + 1)), the AIC between Model 3 and 4 
only slightly improved. In sum, the inclusion of the interaction variable has no effect on 
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the fit of the model. Although the inclusion of this variable increases the significance of 
the white male variable, the white male * exceptional patriotism variable is not 
significant. In this model, white males have 41% lesser odds of drone support than all 
other combinations of race and gender. By this variable, alone, we can see that white 
males do not significantly support drones. Additionally, the white male and exceptional 
patriotism interaction variable may imply that white males are not supporting drones 
based upon their high regard for country.  
In Model 5, Christian is also significantly associated with drone support even 
with the white male variable. Christian respondents have 80.4% greater odds of 
supporting drones than non-Christians respondents with a p-value of 0.000. The white 
as well as male dummy variables also are significant in the odds of drone support; 
males have 111.0% greater odds of drone support than females while whites have 
109.5% greater odds of drone support than all other races.  
In Table 2, Model 6, the inclusion of the Christian*white male interaction 
variable shows a block Chi-Square value of 9.917 (p-value: 0.002). Additionally, the 
AIC score decreases from 2,412.55 to 2420.47, indicating a better fit with the inclusion 
of this variable. Christian respondents have 45.7% greater odds in drone support than 
non-Christian individuals. The white and male dummy variables continue to be 
significant in their relationship with drone support, showing that males have 112.0% 
greater odds of drone support and whites have 106.0% greater odds of drone support. 
Like Model 4, the white male variable significantly shows that white males have 56.2% 
lesser odds of drone support. However, Model 6 differs from Model 4 due to the 
significantly positive effect that the Christian*white male interaction variable has on the 
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odds of drone support. This variable shows that the interaction with white male 
increases the effect of Christian on drone support. By interacting the variables white, 
male, and Christian into a variable, the variable has 104.9% greater odds of drone 
support. Because the prioritization of symbols may be based on the background of an 
individual, individuals who are Christian white males may be prioritizing symbols 
which increase the odds of drone support (Burns and LeMoyne, 2003).  
In Table 2, Model 7, exceptional patriotism has 201.4% greater odds of drone 
support than respondents who are not exceptionally patriotic. Christian respondents do 
not have significantly greater odds of drone support and white males had 53.9% lesser 
odds of supporting drones than all other varieties of race and gender; however, the 
interaction between Christians and white males is significantly positive in its odds of 
drone support. The interaction variable showed that Christian white males have 76.7% 
greater odds of drone support. The significance of this interaction variable, in addition 
to its controls and all former independent variables, shows that being a white male will 
increase the odds of being a Christian who supports drones. As stated previously for 
Model 6, the positive significance of this variable contributes to the idea that individuals 
prioritize symbols which may be affecting their support in other areas such as military 
technology (Burns and LeMoyne, 2003). In particular, these Christian individuals are 
prioritizing symbols which are closely associated with their white male identity. By 
being a Christian white male, these individuals will have higher chances of supporting 
drones than individuals who are only Christian. Next, the interaction variable between 
white male and exceptional patriotism has a low contribution to the model as well as the 
odds of drone support. Because of the insignificance of this interaction variable to the 
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model as well as in the odds of drone support, it is dropped from future models. Lastly, 
Model 7 shows that the white and male dummy variables also continue to be significant 
in the odds of drone support. In this model, whites have 102.4% greater odds of drone 
support than other races and males have 104.7% greater odds of drone support than 
females.  
In Model 8, exceptional patriotism have 217.1% greater odds of supporting 
drones than respondents who are not exceptionally patriotic, even with the introduction 
of the South and South interaction variable. Secondly, Christians have 54.0% greater 
odds of drone support than all other religions. Model 8 also shows that neither the South 
nor the Patriotic Christian South variables are significant in the odds of drone support.  
In Model 9, exceptional patriotism has 201.5% greater odds of drone support 
and Christians have 39.9% greater odds of drone support. Although the Patriotic 
Christian West variable is insignificant in its greater odds for drone support, the West 
variable shows that respondents from the West have 36.5% lesser odds of drone support 
than all other regions in the United States. 
In Table 4, Model 10, exceptional patriotism significantly has 177.2% greater 
odds of drone support while Christians have 41.5% greater odds of drone support. 
Similar to Model 9, the West has 33.5% lesser odds of drone support than other regions; 
however, the interaction between exceptional patriotism and Christian shows that this 
interaction was significant with the West. Respondents who are exceptionally patriotic 
and Christian in the West has 69.2% greater odds of drone support than respondents in 
the Northeast and MidWest regions. This may show that Christians who identify with 
patriotic values and exceptional rhetoric have greater odds of supporting drones. Based 
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on theory, this relationship may be key to associating certain values with ethically 
ambiguous military technology. The dummy variables white and male were significant 
in the odds of drone support; whites have 52.0% greater odds of drone support and 
males have 97.8% greater odds of drone support. 
In Table 4, Model 11, I included the interaction between Christian and white 
male in order to examine its contribution to the model, with white male as a moderating 
variable. This interaction was significant in the odds of drone support, with respondents 
who are Christian white males having 101.3% greater odds of drone support. White 
male proves to be important in examining the relationship between Christians and 
drone support, as the interaction between white male and Christians has a greater odds 
ratio than the Christian and white male variables alone. Because the white male variable 
has significantly lesser odds of drone support and the Christian variable has become 
insignificant, the use of the white male variable as a moderator variable is very 
beneficial to the increased effect of Christian in the odds of drone support.  
In addition to the moderating effect, exceptional patriotism has 169.0% greater 
odds of drone support and the West has 34.6% lesser odds of drone support. Because of 
this opposite effect in the odds of drone support, the interaction of Patriotic Christian 
West is of particular interest due to its significance and positive effect on drone support. 
Although the exceptional patriotism, Christian, and West dummy variables may have 
differentiating effects on the odds of drone support, this interaction shows that 
respondents who are exceptionally patriotic, Christian, and live in the West region have 
82.8% greater odds of drone support. Because of the negative effect of the West on the 
odds of drone support, this interaction shows that exceptional patriotism and Christian 
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identification has a particular effect on the odds of drone support with an individual 
who lives in the West. 
Other Findings 
 In addition to the results pertaining to my expectations, Models 10 and 11 show 
interesting relationships between control variables and drone support. In both Model 10 
and 11, every year increase of age will increase the odds of drone support by 2%. This 
relationship was signification with a p-value of 0.000. 
 In Model 10, respondents with a household income between $60,000 and 
$124,999 had 34.5% greater odds of drone support than respondents whose incomes 
were less than $34,999. Additionally, respondents with an income of more than 
$125,000 had 50.9% greater odds of drone support than respondents with incomes less 
than $34,999. This trend was also shown in Model 11: respondents with incomes 
between $60,000 and $124,999 had 34.7% greater odds of drone support and 
respondents with incomes more than $125,000 had 55.3% greater odds of drone 
support. This implies that greater incomes may increase odds of drone support. 
 In Model 10, respondents who rarely attend or never attend religious services 
have significantly greater odds of drone support than respondents who often attend 
religious services apart from weddings and funerals. Respondents who rarely attend 
religious services have 54.3% greater odds of drone support while respondents who 
never attend religious services have 54.9% greater odds of drone support. Model 11 
also shows this same relationship between levels of religious service attendance and 
drone support. Respondents who rarely attend religious services have 52.7% greater 
odds of drone support while respondents who never attend religious services have 
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63.8% greater odds of drone support than respondents who often attend religious 
services.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 With data collected by the Chicago Council Survey of the American Public 
Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (2014), I was able to examine certain values which 
positively affect the odds of drone support. After reviewing historical and theoretical 
frameworks of patriotism, American exceptionalism, and Christianity, I expected that 
the prioritization of values and rhetoric associated with these concepts would increase a 
respondent’s odds of supporting drones. After estimating binary logistic regressions, I 
found that my conceptualization of exceptional patriotism, a patriotism with undertones 
of American exceptionalism, had significantly greater odds of drone support. In the 
final model, exceptional patriotism had 169.0% greater odds of drone support. The 
continuously significant and positive effect of exceptional patriotism on drone support 
provides evidence that values and rhetoric associated with patriotism and American 
exceptionalism will result in greater odds of supporting ethically ambiguous military 
technology such as drones.  
In addition to exceptional patriotism, Christian identification had greater odds of 
drone support in many of the models. In the final model, the interaction of Christians 
and white males remained significantly positive in the odds of drone support. In Model 
11, this interaction variable shows that Christian white males are 101.3% greater odds 
of drone support than all other combinations of religion, race, and gender. While the 
Christian variable was insignificant and the white male variable was significantly 
negative in the odds of drone support, this interaction may be a valuable contribution in 
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how individuals prioritize values and, in turn, why individuals may support drones in 
bombing attacks. The white males variable increased the positive effect of Christian on 
drones; therefore, rhetoric or values associated with being a Christian white male may 
influence individuals who are Christian white male to support drones.  
Lastly, the combination of exceptional patriotism and Christian identification 
had a particular effect on respondents in the West region. When the West variable was 
interacted with exceptional patriotism and Christian, its effect on the odds of drone 
support were significantly positive. Alone, the West variable was significantly negative 
in the odds of drone support. Therefore, the combination of exceptional patriotism and 
Christian identification was key in the positive effect on the odds of drone support 
within the West. With the same interaction with the South variable included in the 
model, the West’s interaction with exceptional patriotism and Christian shows that this 
combination has greater odds of drone support than respondents in the NorthEast and 
MidWest regions. According to the theoretical and historical frameworks of this study, 
the values of patriotism, the traditional use of Christian symbolism, and the rhetoric of 
American exceptionalism may have an effect on the West’s odds of drone support. 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
Examining the effects of drone support will contribute to the meanings behind 
the use of technology in military interventions and, eventually, the meanings behind the 
recreational use of military technology. As discussed by Joelien Pretorius (2008), 
technology should be understood as a social process. Aside from understanding drone 
technology or drone engineers as products of the time, Pretorius urges the consideration 
of meanings associated with technology in terms of necessity. At a time when social 
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institutions are beginning to domestically incorporate drones for legal or recreational 
use, the values used to justify the current use of drones need to be examined. 
This study has revealed opportunities for future research. First, the 2014 
Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy dataset 
focuses on drones in regards to its use in foreign policy; hopefully, future research will 
be able to capture the attitudes towards drones in regards to domestic policy. At a time 
when drones are being used by local law enforcements, issues surrounding ‘right to 
privacy’ are particularly relevant when studying a sample’s attitudes towards drones 
(Bennett, 2011; Takahashi, 2012). More research should be done on the militant 
application of drones on American citizens and how it affects people’s attitudes towards 
drones.  
 The dataset offers Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Other, and No religion as 
options for respondents; however, variations of each of these religious preferences are 
not offered. For example, my study will not be able to elaborate on the differences 
between a Methodist, Baptist, or Catholic Christian which may provide interesting 
results in the West and South regions. Additionally, mainstream and evangelical 
Christian are unaccounted for. Further research must be done to examine the different 
identities within religious preferences. 
 Lastly, the main focus of this dataset is to identify people’s attitudes; however, it 
does not incorporate self-reported behaviors. Because of the similar environment, pilots 
and engineers typically use video games such as Killbox to prepare themselves for the 
execution and functionality of a drone (Evans-Thirlwell, 2015). Due to the similarities 
found between video games and the actual control of drones, the popularity and 
39 
widespread use of video games could have an effect on people’s attitudes towards 
drones. Video games may alleviate the hesitancy to support drones due to the similar 
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Table 1: Frequency Distribution 
Variable Frequency % Mean Standard 
Deviation 
     
Dependent     
    Drone Support Supports= 1,313 64.2   
 Does Not Support= 657 32.1   
     
Independent     
    Exceptional Patriotism Exceptionally Patriotic= 1,371 67.0   
 Not exceptionally patriotic= 675 33.0   
     
    Religious Denomination Christian= 1,423 69.6   
 Not Christian= 623 30.4   
     
    White Males White Males= 657 32.1   
 Else= 1,389 67.9   
     
    Region of Residence South= 731 35.7   
 West= 517 25.3   
 Else= 798 39.0   
     
Control     
    Education Less than High School= 249 12.2   
 High School= 635 31.0   
 Some College= 518 25.3   
 Bachelor’s Degree or More= 644 31.5   
     
    Household Has Internet Access Yes= 1,652 80.7   
 No= 394 19.3   
     
    Age   48.83 17.13 
     
    Income Level Income less than $34,999= 586 28.6   
 Income between $35,000 and 
$59,999= 446 
21.8   
 Income between $60,000 and 
$124,999= 712 
34.8   
 Income more than $125,000= 302 14.8   
     
    Religious Attendance Often Attends= 656 32.1   
 Sometimes Attends= 170 8.1   
 Rarely Attends= 804 39.3   
 Never Attends= 416 20.3   
     
    Male Male= 1,044 51.0   
 Female= 1,002 49.0   
     
    White White= 1,278 62.5   
 Else= 768 37.5   
     
    Conservatism Conservative= 478 23.4   
 Else= 1,568 76.6   
     





Table 2: Binary Logistic Regressions of Selected Variables  
on Drone Support, Models 1 – 4 
Drone Support Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Exceptional atriotism 3.435***  3.410*** 3.102*** 
 (0.102)  (0.103) (0.123) 
     
Christian  1.885***   
  (0.102)   
     
White   2.098*** 2.095*** 
   (0.143) (0.142) 
     
Male   2.068*** 2.066*** 
   (0.160) (0.159) 
     
White Male   0.708 0.590* 
   (0.207) (0.243) 
     
Exceptional patriotism * 
White Male 
   1.381 
    (0.228) 









     
AIC 2361.5 2473.88 2308.54 2308.524 
Chi-Square 150.831*** 38.445*** 211.793*** 213.804*** 
Source: Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, 2014   
N = 1,970 
Reported in odds ratio values 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 3: Binary Logistic Regressions of Selected Variables  
on Drone Support, Models 5 – 9 
Drone Support Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
      
Exceptional patriotism   3.014*** 3.171*** 3.015*** 
   (0.124) (0.112) (0.108) 
      
Christian  1.804*** 1.457** 1.251 1.540*** 1.399** 
 (0.104) (0.125) (0.127) (0.114) (0.114) 
      
White 2.000*** 2.060*** 2.024***   
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.144)   
      
Male 2.110*** 2.120*** 2.047***   
 (0.155) (0.154) (0.159)   
      
White Male 0.706 0.438** 0.461**   
 (0.201) (0.250) (0.280)   
      
Patriotism * White Male   1.185   
   (0.234)   
      
Christian * White Male  2.049** 1.767*   
  (0.228) (0.241)   
      
South    1.128  
    (0.138)  
      
Patriotic Christian South    1.005  
    (0.199)  
      
West     0.635** 
     (0.145) 
      
Patriotic Christian West     1.493 
     (0.230) 











      
AIC 2420.47 2412.554 2294.513 2351.751 2343.187 
Chi-Square 99.857*** 109.773**** 231.814*** 168.576*** 177.140*** 
Source: Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2014   
N = 1,970 
Reported in odds ratio values 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4: Binary Logistic Regressions of Selected Variables  
on Drone Support, Models 10 – 11 
Drone Support Model 10 Model 11 
   
Exceptional Patriotism 2.772*** 2.690*** 
 (0.128) (0.128) 
   
Christian  1.415* 1.157 
 (0.149) (0.165) 
   
South 1.115 1.096 
 (0.159) (0.159) 
   
West 0.665* 0.654** 
 (0.165) (0.165) 
   
Patriotic Christian South 1.063 1.115 
 (0.217) (0.218) 
   
Patriotic Christian West 1.692* 1.828* 
 (0.251) (0.252) 
   
Christian * White Male  2.013** 
  (0.246) 
   
White Male 0.757 0.474** 
 (0.213) (0.268) 
   
White 1.520** 1.559** 
 (0.155) (0.155) 
   
Male 1.978*** 1.988*** 
 (0.164) (0.163) 
   
Conservative 1.170 1.137 
 (0.135) (0.136) 
   
Age 1.020*** 1.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
   
Less than High School 0.960 0.967 
 (0.193) (0.193) 
   
High School Diploma or GED 0.958 0.948 
 (0.143) (0.144) 
   
Some College 1.121 1.112 
 (0.143) (0.143) 
   
Internet Access 1.052 1.045 
 (0.148) (0.149) 
   
Household Income: $35,000 - $59,999 1.094 1.116 
 (0.153) (0.154) 
   










   
Sometimes Attends Religious Services 1.387 1.375 
 (0.207) (0.208) 
   
Rarely Attends Religious Services 1.543** 1.527** 
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Table 4. Continued 
 (0.131) (0.131) 
   
Never Attends Religious Services 1.549* 1.638** 
 (0.171) (0.173) 
   
Intercept 0.114*** 0.130*** 
 (0.310) (0.312) 
   
AIC 2261.072 2254.975 
Chi-Square 293.256*** 301.353*** 
Source: Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2014 
N= 1,970 
Reported in odds ratio values   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
 
